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COMMENTS
SOLAR RIGHTS AND RESTRICTIVE
COVENANTS: A MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS
I. Introduction
The conflict between an individual preference to freely use one's
own property and a collective agreement which circumscribes that
freedom is as significant as the issue of access to sunlight,, an issue
which has thus far received greater attention.' Private agreements
between landowners, designed to enhance the general quality of the
neighborhood, may impede the use of solar devices and affect devel-
1. A homeowner who installs a solar energy system has no recourse when a neighbor builds
a structure which blocks out the sunlight. As a general proposition, property owners do not
have a right to receive the sunlight which beams across the property of another. The right to
receive sunlight is restricted to the light falling perpendicularly on one's land. See W. PROS-
SER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 13, at 69-73 (4th ed. 1971). There is a narrow exception
to the rule that one has an unrestricted right to the sunlight falling directly over land. This
is the situation where shadows are cast by aircraft. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S.
256 (1946). In Causby, the Supreme Court rejected the ancient doctrine that a landowner
owned an unrestricted right to all the airspace above the land. See notes 90-93 infra and
accompanying text.
2. To insure access to sunlight, scholars have suggested the use of established legal princi-
ples as well as the creation of new statutory rights. See 1977 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE,
SOLAR ACCESS AND LAND USE: STATE OF THE LAW; Becker, Common Law Sun Rights: An
Obstacle to Solar Heating and Cooling, 3 J. OF CONTEMP. L. 19 (1976); Eisenstadt & Utton,
Solar Rights and their Effect on Solar Heating and Cooling, 16 NAT. RESOURCE J. 363 (1976);
Moskowitz, Legal Access to Light: The Solar Energy Imperative, 9 NAT. RESOURCE LAw. 177
(1976); White, The Allocation of Sunlight: Solar Rights and the Prior Appropriation Doctrine,
47 UNIv. COLO. L. REv. 421 (1976); Zillman & Deeney, Legal Aspects of Solar Energy
Development, 1976 Amz. ST. L.J. 25 (1976); Comment, Solar Rights: Guaranteeing A Place
in the Sun, 57 ORE. L. REv. 94 (1977). The solutions offered include: reviving the "Doctrine
of Ancient Lights," which provides for an easement to light by prescription; construing the
casting of shadows on a neighbor's land as a public nuisance; allowing homeowners to con-
tract with neighbors for an express easement to sunlight; applying by analogy, the law of
water rights utilizing the reasonable use or prior appropriation formula; provide for the free
transfer of development rights; and, easing certain zoning restrictions which limit the use of
solar energy systems or prevent southern exposure of roof tops. Because many of these solu-
tions pose greater problems than they solve, solar advocates have focused their efforts on state
legislatures to enact new laws to protect solar access. These efforts have proved successful in
several states. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 38-32.5-101 (1974); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 2-
218(b)(7) (Cum. Supp. 1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-05-01.1 (1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 215.055
(1978). The problem of solar access may not be as acute as it theoretically appears; the
complete absence of litigation in this area suggests that neighbors may be more amiable than
the problem presumes. One writer has suggested, "if a duty not to obstruct the access to light
exists, a [parabolic] reflector . . . could conceivably be annexed to the otherwise obstructing
building and thereby perpetuate the access to light." Moskowitz, supra at 192.
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opment of solar energy.3 This Comment will evaluate the enforce-
ability of restrictive covenants in light of the claim that solar energy
should be exploited as a means toward ameliorating the present
energy crisis. This analysis will be based upon an economic model
of property rights formulated by Professors Ellickson,4 Coase,5 Cala-
bresi and Melamed.1 Although courts rarely explicitly employ eco-
nomic criteria in their evaluation of land-use conflicts, the effort to
promote an efficient allocation of resources pervades property law,
as it does other legal doctrines.'
II. The Economic Model of Land-Use Planning
Economists generally believe that if the economic market remains
free of imperfections and intervention by the government, private
transactions will allocate resources optimally.' Under theoretically
ideal competition,'
where all prices end up equal to marginal costs, where all factor-prices end
up equal to values of marginal products and all total costs are minimized,
where the genuine desires and well-being of individuals are all represented
by their marginal utilities as expressed in their dollar-voting-then the re-
sulting equilibrium has the efficiency property that you cannot make any one
man better off without hurting some other man.
Essentially, a planner could not design a solution different from the
laissez-faire one which could improve the welfare of all.
Land development markets, however, do not always reflect these
3. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, LEGAL BARmias To SOLAR HEATING AND COOLING OF
BUILoINGS at iii-iv (1977) (U.S. Dep't of Commerce Nat'l Tech. Info. Serv.). Public land use
restrictions, in addition to technological, political, social and economic factors, impede
greater use of solar energy. For a thorough discussion of these issues, see id.; S. FELDMAN &
B. ANDERSON, THE PUBuC UTIUrrY AND SOLAR ENERGY INTERFACE: AN ASSESSMENT OF POLICY
OrrIONS (1976); C. FIELD & S. RIVKIN, THE BUILDING CODE BURDEN (1975); Thomas, Solar
Energy and the Law, 82 CASE & COMMENT 3 (1978).
4. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use
Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 681 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Ellickson].
5. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. oF L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
6. Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View
of the Cathedral, 85 HANy. L. REv. 1089 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Calabresil.
,7. For a general discussion of the utility of economic analysis in many areas of the law,
see B. ACKERMAN, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW (1975); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
2d. §§ 288-311 (1965).
8. Ellickson, supra note 4, at 683. Professor Ellickson hastens to add that due to an initial
uneven distribution of resources, efficiency many not necessarily result in an equitable alloca-
tion of resources. Id.
9. P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 632 (9th ed. 1973).
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"perfect" properties. The private action of landowners often entails
"externalities" or "spillovers."'' A landowner's action will have an
impact on non-consenting outsiders because he only considers the
private costs of his action, ignoring the social costs. Whether the
externality is of a positive or negative nature, there is a suboptimal
allocation of land-use resources. Welfare economists have urged
that externalities be "internalized" by bringing social costs in line
with private costs." Thus, a landowner who causes negative exter-
nalities should be forced to pay for the damage caused by his activ-
ity. Conversely, the landowner who causes positive externalities
should be subsidized by those who receive the benefit of the activity.
The three most common land-use control systems designed to
internalize externalities are zoning, covenants and nuisance law.
According to Professor Ellickson, three factors must be considered
in deciding which of the systems to employ: nuisance costs, preven-
tion costs and administrative costs. He refers to "nuisance costs" as
externalities which decrease the value of neighboring property;
"prevention costs" as non-administrative expenses made by either
the nuisance-maker or the injured neighbor to reduce the level of
nuisance activity; and "administrative costs" as the public and
private costs of arranging laws and agreements, policing those
agreements and executing preventive measures to enforce the agree-
ments."2 Ellickson argues that the most efficient system is that one
which minimizes the sum of nuisance, prevention and administra-
tive costs. 3
III. Covenants
A covenant is a promise to do or refrain from doing a certain
10. Professor Ellickson defines externalities as "impacts on nonconsenting outsiders."
Ellickson, supra note 4, at 684. A conventional economist would define externalities as the
difference between private and social cost. P. SAMUELSON, supra note 9, at 477. Soot spewing
out of a coke plant causing damage to neighboring landowners is often cited as a classic
example of negative externalities. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219,
257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312(1970); Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 236 A.D. 37
258 N.Y.S. 229 (4th Dep't 1932).
11. Ellickson, supra note 4, at 683. "Internalization is said to be accomplished through
devices that force a nuisance maker to bear the true costs of his activity. . . . These
[devices] range from those that are compatible with the continuance of the private markets
to those that seek to supplant the market mechanism altogether. Id. at 684.
12. Id. at 688-89.
13. Id. at 690.
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activity relating to the use of land. 4 The terms of the covenant are
decided upon by the parties, with the government providing a judi-
cial system for the enforcement of these privately negotiated agree-
ments. Successors in interest to the contracting parties are bound
by the covenant at law when (1) the contracting parties intended
for their successors to be bound, (2) the covenant "touches and
concerns" the land, (3) "privity of estate" existed between the con-
tracting parties, and (4) the successors in interest had notice of the
restriction. 5
If the covenant fulfills the requirements at law or equity, it may
be enforced by the owner of the benefited land against the owner of
the burdened land. A covenant entered into between a developer of
a neighborhood plan and purchasers, however, presents peculiar
problems of enforceability. Where a developer constructs a tract of
land and proceeds to sell off the lots to separate grantees, a covenant
in the deed could be enforced by the grantor/developer but, without
specific proof in the deed that subsequent purchasers will also be
bound by the same covenant or that prior grantees may enforce the
restriction against subsequent grantees, there may be no means to
insure that the covenants will be enforced.'"
To protect prior grantees' expectations, the law will imply recip-
rocal negative servitudes. Immediately upon the developer's repre-
sentation to purchasers that subsequent purchasers will be bound
by similar restrictions in the use of their land, an implied reciprocal
14. A covenant has two sides: a burden side and a benefit side. See 5 R. POWELL, THE LAW
or REAL PROPERTY § 671, at 144 (1977); AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.1, at 337 (A. Casner,
ed. 1952); Annot., Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions, 20 AM. JuR. 2d § 292, at 856
(1965).
15. A suit in equity does not require proof of "privity" between the contracting parties.
The distinction between a suit at law and one in equity is principally the remedy sought for
breach of the covenant. At law, money damages are recoverable; in equity, only injunctive
relief or specific performance may be granted. 5 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §§
672-75 (1977); AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 9.9-9.20 (A. Casner, ed. 1952); Annot.,
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions, 20 AM. JUR. 2d §§ 312-319 (1965).
16. Where the initial grantees covenant with the grantor who neglects to insert identical
covenants into the deeds of subsequent grantees, the former is bound by restriction whereas
subsequent purchasers are not bound. A similiar inequity results where subsequent grantees
attempt to enforce the covenant against the initial grantees. The subsequent grantees would
have to show that they were third party beneficiaries to the contract between the grantor and
the initial grantees. In most instances, subsequent grantees are not made third party benefici-
aries. 5 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §§ 680-81 (1977); AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 9.33 (A. Casner, ed. 1952); Annot., Convenants, Conditions and Restrictions, 20 AM. JUR.
2d. §§ 288-311 (1965).
[Vol. VII
1979] SOLAR RIGHTS 287
servitude against the developer's remaining land arises. Purchasers
may then enforce the restriction against any and all other purchas-
ers, not by enforcing the agreement made between themselves and
the developer, but by enforcing the servitude created by implication
at the time of the conveyance to the initial purchaser. 7 All purchas-
ers are bound by the covenant and all have a reciprocal right to
enforce the covenant against other purchasers in the neighborhood.
This kind of covenant arises only when a plan of development exists
at the time of the sale' s and when subsequent grantees have notice
of the plan."
A covenant imposed by a developer binding all landowners within
a neighborhood is a potentially efficient device for internalizing
nuisance costs and for allocating land-use resources. Unlike zoning °
17. Sanborn v. McClean, 233 Mich. 227, 206 N.W. 496 (1925).
18. A neighborhood plan may be proven by evidence of a plat of the subdivision which is
filed for record, reference to which is then made in conveyance of the separate lots (King v.
Kugler, 197 Cal. App. 2d 651, 17 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1961)); by publication of the restricted nature
of the subdivision in advance of any sale (Feigen v. Green Harbour Beach Club, Inc. 204
N.Y.S.2d 381 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. 1960)); or by proof that the developer inserted similar
covenants in a substantial number of deeds in the lots sold prior to the lot sold to subsequent
grantees (Sanborn v. McClean, 233 Mich. 227, 206 N.W. 496 (1925)). Some courts refuse to
imply reciprocal negative servitudes where no reference to a general plan is made in the deed
of a party against whom enforcement is sought. Werner v. Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 183 P. 945
(1919); accord, Riley v. Bear Creek Planning Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d 500, 551 P.2d 1213, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 381 (1976).
19. Notice may be actual; by record (Northwest Civ. Ass'n v. Sheldon, 317 Mich. 416, 27
N.W.2d 36 (1947)); or by inquiry (Sanborn v. McClean, 233 Mich. 227, 206 N.W. 496 (1925)).
Inquiry notice requires a purchaser to survey the surrounding neighborhood and to notice
whether it has been built in accordance with a general plan. Sanborn v. McClean, 233 Mich.
at 232-33, 206 N.W. at 498.
20. Zoning is a land use control system which limits the class of activities permitted in
an area, sets architectural standards for the buildings within the zoned area and is mandatory
in application. Compliance with these requirements inevitably entails high prevention and
administrative costs. Therefore, to be an efficient control system, zoning must greatly reduce
nuisance costs. It has been argued, however, that zoning does not guarantee a greater reduc-
tion in nuisance costs than would reliance on the private market. Professor Ellickson main-
tains that natural market forces cause similar land users to be attracted to the same areas,
which is the major objective of zoning.
Ellickson, supra note 4, at 692-97. The inefficiency which can result in the application of a
zoning ordinance, particularly in restricting the use of solar energy, is illustrated in D'Aurio
v. Board of Zoning App., 92 Misc. 2d 898, 401 N.Y.S.2d 425 (Sup. Ct. 1978). In this case,
plaintiff challenged a Board order denying his application for an area zoning variance for
the purpose of installing a solar energy system to their home. By placing the unit in front
of the home, plaintiff would violate a zoning ordinance that each front yard have a minimum
depth of fifty feet and be free of any structures. The court affirmed the Board order because
it found that the plaintiff did not show practical difficulties or significant economic injury.
"At most, they have shown personal convenience" as justification for the variance. Id. at
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and nuisance law," only minimal prevention and administrative
costs are necessary to internalize relatively small nuisance costs.22
Externalities are eliminated at the outset by inserting the covenant
into all of the deeds. Land-use resources are maximized because the
reduction in future nuisance costs to each party will exceed the sum
of the prevention and administrative costs each agrees to bear.
Harmful externalities which do not entail great nuisance costs may
thus be internalized cheaply and efficiently. Those covenants in-
serted into the deeds will impose standards which increase the land
value of the lots, a benefit to the landowners and the developer
alike. However, where the conditions of the neighborhood change
899, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 426. This case does not comport with the analysis offered in the
economic model. The court did not discuss, nor was proof offered to show, whether the
placement of the collectors in the front-yard entailed high nuisance costs for neighboring
landowners. Assuming, arguendo, that the collector did entail harmful externalities, the
court's order enjoining the use of the system, according to Professor Calabresi, is not the most
efficient means to internalize these externalities. Professor Calabresi argues that a system of
general deterrence in which the nuisance maker pays a monetary penalty calculated to equal
the damage done to his neighbor's land, is a more efficient internalization device than the
injunctive remedy traditionally granted in a zoning action. The nuisance maker would either
pay damages or forego installation of the system; a rational decision maker will choose the
more efficient alternative. Calabresi, supra note 6, at 1094. See note 23 infra and accompany-
ing text. The application of the zoning ordinance and the traditional means which courts use
to enforce the ordinance often entail higher prevention costs (the potential savings to a solar
energy user) than the reduction in nuisance costs achieved. An analysis comporting with the
model would account for these competing interests and would fashion a remedy which mini-
mized total costs.
21. Professor Ellickson considers nuisance law as potentially the most efficient and equi-
table land use control system. The laissez-faire distribution of property rights is altered by
placing "the risk of loss from external harms on the landowner carrying out the damaging
activity. . . . [Al party compelled to bear a nuisance cost can be expected to adopt all
preventive measures he perceives as efficient. A measure will appear efficient to a party if
its prevention costs and administrative costs of carrying it out ae less than the reduction in
nuisance costs achieved." Ellickson, supra note 4, at 724. This conclusion is essentially the
rationale for Professor Calabresi's general deterrant remedy and is based on Coase's path-
breaking article. See note 5 supra. Nuisance law remains an inefficient land use control
system because it is burdened with high administrative and prevention costs. The adminis-
trative costs of a nuisance action include the great burden of proof plaintiff bears in the
lawsuit as well as high legal fees necessary to prosecute an action. These costs may be so high
as to deter those burdened with harmful externalities from bringing suit. The prevention costs
imposed with the issuance of the injunction, the traditional remedy in nuisance suits, may
lead the court to deny relief to a plaintiff and thereby allow the nuisance to continue. Profes-
sor Ellickson recommends a reformulation of nuisance law to lower administrative costs and
supports Professor Calabresi's proposal for a remedy of general deterrence. Until these recom-
mendations are accepted, however, nuisance law remains an inefficient control system. El-
lickson, supra note 4, at 761-79.
22. See note 44 infra and accompanying text.
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or the purpose of the covenant is expanded byond the parties' in-
tent, enforcement of the covenant will not produce an optimal allo-
cation of land use resources.
This Comment will use the economic model outlined above2 1 to
analyze the competing interests presented in the first, and thus far
only, reported case which considers the issue of whether a restrictive
covenant barring the installation of appliances on roof tops includes
within its prohibition the installation of solar collectors.2'
IV. Kraye v. Old Orchard Association
In Kraye v. Old Orchard Association,'2 plaintiff wished to install
a solar water heating system on his home and, in connection with
the installation, to place upon the roof "collector plates. '26 Defen-
dant community association, charged with the responsibility of en-
forcing the covenant, claimed that the installation of such collector
plates violated certain covenants, conditions and restrictions in the
plaintiff's deed.27 These covenants prohibited the placing of installa-
tions or appliances on house roofs, if visible from neighboring prop-
erty or adjacent street, absent approval of the neighborhood associa-
tion .2s
Plaintiff brought an action for declaratory relief contending that
the covenant was void and unenforceable for three reasons: (1) the
covenant was designed to protect aesthetic values and such cove-
nants are invalid as a matter of law; (2) assuming the covenant's
23. See notes 9-15 supra and accompanying text.
24. Kraye v. Old Orchard Ass'n, No. C 209453 (Super. Ct. L.A. Co. Sept. 13, 1978).
25. Id.
26. Brief for Plaintiff at 3, Kraye v. Old Orchard Ass'n, No. C 209453 (Super. Ct. L.A.
Co. Sept. 13, 1978).
27. Brief for Defendants at 2, Kraye v. Old Orchard Ass'n No. C 209453 (Super. Ct. L.A.
Co. Sept. 13, 1978). Article X, Section 12 of the plaintiff's deed states: "In addition to the
architectural control provided pursuant to Article VII hereof applicances or installations upon
the roofs of structures shall not be permitted unless they are installed in such a manner that
they are not visible from neighboring property or adjacent streets." Article VII states,
"No building, fence, wall or other structures or landscaping shall be commenced,
erected or maintained upon the Properties, nor shall any exterior addition to or change
or alteration therein or change in the exterior appearance thereof or change in the
landscaping be made until the plans and specifications showing the nature, kind,
shape, height, materials, color and location of the same shall have been submitted to
and approved in writing as to harmony of external design and location in relation to
surrounding structures and topography by the Board or by an architectural committee
composed by three (3) or more representatives appointed in the By-laws of the associa-
tion." Id.
28. Id.
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validity, it may not be enforced to bar installation of the solar en-
ergy system because this was not the intent of the parties when the
covenant was agreed upon; and 3) whatever the intent of the parties
at the time the covenant was agreed upon, conditions have changed
so much since the restriction was adopted that it was no longer
useful and economical to enforce the restriction.29 The court granted
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment based not on any of these
claims but, rather, on recent statutory authority which bars enforce-
ment of a covenant which would effectively impede the use of solar
energy."
A. Regulation of Aesthetic Blight
In Kraye, plaintiff argued that California should not enforce
"restraints on the free use of land which have no other support than
aesthetic considerations."3 This proposition is not in accord with
the great weight of modem authority. Originally, the difficulty in
defining a standard for aesthetic values made the courts reluctant
to accept aesthetics as an acceptable goal of regulation, whether by
the state or between private parties. Professor Williams writes that
beauty is as difficult for lawyers to determine as it is for the philoso-
phers who have long discussed the problem. 2 More recently, how-
ever, with the increasing concern for the various aspects of the envi-
ronment, the courts have supported the effort to provide for some
protection for an attractive environment. A wide variety of controls
directed against whatever is regarded as ugly have been approved.
A standard which measures the burden of aesthetic blight as equal
to the reduction in market value of neighboring land solves the
problem of the irrational decision-maker.33 In no other area of plan-
ning law has the change in judicial attitude been so great. 34
By the 1920's, almost every state faced challenges to public regu-
29. Brief for Plaintiff at 3, Kraye v. Old Orchard Ass'n No. C 209453 (Super. Ct. L.A.
Co. Sept. 13, 1978). For the purpose of this Comment, it will be assumed that the covenant
may not be attacked as void for vagueness, that the defendants have standing to sue and that
the association's judgment was reasonable. These issues are often raised in cases attacking
the validity of a covenant. See Hannula v. Hacienda Homes, 34 Cal. 2d 442, 211 P.2d 302
(1949); Annot., 40. A.L.R. 3d 864 (1970).
30. Kraye v. Old Orchard Ass'n, No. C 209453 (Super. Ct. L.A. Co. Sept. 13, 1978).
31. Supplemental Brief for Plaintiff at 3, Kraye v. Old Orchard Ass'n., No. C 209453
(Super. Ct. L.A. Co. Sept. 13, 1978).
32. N. WILLIAMS, AMEwCAN LAND PLANNING LAw § 11.02, at 244 (1974).
33. See note 94 infra and accompanying text.
34. N. WILLIAMS, AMmCAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 11.02, at 345 (1974).
[Vol. VII
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lations which restricted land-use on aesthetic grounds.35 Some state
courts were receptive to aesthetic values as a goal of state regulation
while others were not.3" However, by the time zoning was fully estab-
lished in the 1930's most courts either accepted aesthetics as a valid
ground for state regulation or, at least, recognized aesthetics as one
of several supporting factors.37 In Perlmutter v. Greene, Judge
Pound of the New York Court of Appeals provided strong support
for state regulation of aesthetic blight. "Beauty may not be queen,
but she is not an outcast beyond the pale of protection or respect.
She may at least shelter herself under the wing of safety, morality,
or decency. '"31
Private regulation of aesthetics, through enforcement of restric-
tive covenants, has also been upheld. Indeed, it is a logical proposi-
tion that if the strong hand of the state may regulate aesthetic
values, private parties are free to make arrangements among them-
selves which protect the aesthetic quality of their neighborhood. A
typical case upholding such a covenant is Kirk ley v. Seipelt. 10 In this
case appellants sued to enjoin the installation of hard-surfaced per-
manent awnings and porch covers on the windows of neighboring
homes subject to a restrictive covenant barring such installation
without the grantor's consent.4 The Maryland Court of Appeals
35. A few courts had faced the issue earlier. See Passaic v. Patterson Bill Posting, Adver-
tising and Sign Co. 72 N.J.L. 285, 62 A. 267 (1905) (invalidated regulation); Varney & Green
v. Williams, 155 Cal. 318, 100 P. 867 (1909) (upheld regulation).
36. See generally N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW, ch. 11 (1974).
37. Id. § 11.11 and cases cited therein.
38. 259 N.Y. 327, 182 N.E. 5 (1932).
39. Id. at 332, 182 N.E. at 6. The complete acceptance of aesthetics as a goal of state
regulation is generally thought to have been influenced by favorable dictum in Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). In this case the owner of a department store challenged the
government's use of the eminent domain power to take his property as part of a redevelop-
ment project in the area. Writing for the majority, Mr. Justice Douglas stated, "[plublic
safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order-these are some of the more
conspicuous examples of the traditional application of the police power to municipal affairs.
Yet they merely illustrate the scope of the power and do not delimit it. . . . It is within the
power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as
healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled." Id. at 32-33.
The strong trend towards increased respect for aesthetic regulation through the use of the
state's police power has continued unabated in the mid-1970s. N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND
PLANNING LAw § 11.11 (Supp. 1978).
40. 212 Md. 127, 128 A.2d 430 (1957).
41. Id. at 132-33, 128 A.2d at 433-34. The covenant stated: "No building shall be erected,
placed or altered on any building plot in this subdivision until the external design and
location thereof have been approved, in writing, by the Rodgers Forge Realty Corp., its
. I
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rejected appellee's contention that the covenant was unreasonable
and indefinite. Relying on a case decided by it some years earlier,42
the court held that a covenant designed to secure a better class of
buildings, with attractive surroundings, was in all respects legal."3
Covenants among homeowners are an efficient device to internal-
ize the harmful externalities of aesthetic blight. A promise inserted
into all of the deeds in a neighborhood not to add unsightly struc-
tures to the home will give all homeowners a benefit which might
otherwise be too costly to guarantee by individual nuisance suits.
Homeowners may freely choose to be bound by those restrictions
which they consider beneficial to their property, unlike the burden
of zoning ordinances which are often imposed by government with-
out a homeowner's consent. A covenant carefully drafted will entail
lower administrative costs than will compliance with zoning ordi-
nances or the maintainance of a nuisance action." Land values of
the property in the area will increase with only a minimum loss of
flexibility to the homeowner. 5
Ironically, the elimination of aesthetics as a benefit enforceable
in reciprocal negative covenants is a two-edge sword. Whereas
plaintiff in Kraye might have the right to install a solar system if
this benefit was limited, environmentalists would lose a valuable
tool for protecting our natural resources in other situations. Those
sincerely interested in protecting the environment should hesitate
successors, or assigns." Id. at 132, 128 A.2d at 433.
42. Peabody Heights Co. v. Willson, 82 Md. 186, 32 A. 386 (1895).
43. 212 Md. at 132-33, 128 A.2d at 433; accord, Winslette v. Keeler, 220 Ga. 100, 137
S.E.2d 288 (1964). In this case, a restrictive covenant which required the grantee to submit
building plans to the grantor for approval to insure that such plans were in "conformity and
harmony of external design and general quality with the existing standards of the neighbor-
hood" was not vague or indefinite and, therefore, enforceable. The court held that "the
grantor here saw fit to impose restrictions for his own protection and for the protection of other
property owners in the neighborhood, and it cannot be said that the covenant imposed is
against public policy, as a covenant to maintain the high quality of a subdivision is not
harmful to the public welfare." Id. at 101, 137 S.E.2d at 289.
44. Prevention and administrative costs are low because the promise is inserted into the
deed at the outset and each party pays a minimal fee to support a community group which
polices compliance with the covenant. Ellickson, supra note 4, at 714.
45. It should not be implied that the association, in Kraye, proved that the solar energy
system was offensive to the aesthetic standards set by the covenant. Solar systems need not
be ugly to be functional. Professional Builder's Report on Solar Energy in 1976 PROFESSIONAL
BUILDER 101 (1976). Whether the defendant-association exercised proper judgment in finding
that the system violated the covenant is an issue beyond the scope of this Comment. See
Hannula v. Hacienda Homes, 34 Cal. 2d 442, 211 P.2d 302 (1949).
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before relinquishing a valuable and efficient device for promoting
aesthetics and all other environmental values.
B. The Covenant's Purpose
The second issue presented by plaintiff in Kraye is that the cove-
nant was not intended to bar installation of a solar energy system.
A covenant is simply a contract of a special nature. The general rule
of construction of a contract is to gather the intention of the parties
from the writing and by considering the surrounding circumstances
as the parties are presumed to have considered.'"
Professor Ellickson makes the same point but with a different
perspective. The purpose of a covenant, according to Ellickson's
model, is to raise land values. Only those covenants which reduce
nuisance costs more than the loss in flexibility and administrative
costs will be inserted into a deed. The enforcement of a covenant
which would entail higher prevention and administrative costs than
the corresponding reduction in nuisance costs is not value-
maximizing. The assumption is that parties who dealt with each
other fairly and at arm's length could only have intended to agree
on an efficient and economical arrangement. The search for intent
is therefore a search for those nuisance costs which may be internal-
ized without high prevention and administrative costs. 7
The covenant restriction in Kraye's deed was entered into in July,
1967. The agreement forbids any "installation on the roof" or
"exterior change or addition" on the house without the approval of
the architectural committee. 8 On its face, the restriction appears
sufficiently broad to preclude the installation of the solar collectors.
However, the willingness of the courts to look beyond the express
language of the covenant to ascertain its purpose reflects judicial
acceptance of the rule formulated by Ellickson, if not his reason-
ing.'" When enforcement of the covenant would entail higher pre-
vention and administrative costs than the corresponding reduction
in nuisance costs, a result which the parties do not intend,10 the
courts will find that the covenant was not designed to restrict the
46. Clark v. Devoe, 124 N.Y. 120, 124, 26 N.E. 275, 276 (1891).
47. Ellickson, supra note 4, at 713-14.
48. Brief for Defendants at 2, Kraye v. Old Orchard Ass'n, No. C 209453 (Super. Ct. L.A.
Co. Sept. 13, 1978).
49. See, e.g., Whitehurst v. Burgess, 130 Va. 572, 107 S.E. 630 (1921); Holliday v. Sphar,
262 Ky. 45, 89 S.W.2d 327 (1935).
50. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
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particular nuisance activity at issue. Although this economic analy-
sis may lead to the same result as the traditional reasoning used by
the courts,5' it focuses more clearly on the nature and purpose of the
agreement.
Several cases illustrate the courts' interest in first considering the
purpose of the covenant and then determining its scope in relation
to the purpose. In Granger v. Boulls,2 the defendant promised not
to erect any building "to be used or occupied for any purpose other
than private residence or dwelling . ... 1 The court held that
although this covenant barred the erection of farm buildings, such
as a chicken house, it did not operate to bar the use of the land in
support of livestock. 5 Berger v. State5 is in accord. In this case a
covenant in defendant's deed prohibited the erection of any building
except a dwelling house and limited the use of the land to private
residential purposes." The State of New Jersey sought to use a
building subject to the restriction to house several multi-
handicapped, pre-school children and two foster parents. The court
held that the restriction barring the erection of any building except
a dwelling house was not violated by multi-family occupancy. The
court found that the covenant regulated only the type of structure
which could be built, not the purpose for which the structure could
be used. In addition, the covenant limiting the use of land to
private residential use did not restrict the use of the land to one
families comprised exclusively of related members.
"There is simply nothing to suggest that the relationship of the persons
within a dwelling was of any concern to the common grantor. Rather, it is
reasonable to conclude that its predominant interest was to preserve a family
style of living, that is, a style characterized by fairly stable, rather than
transient relationships, a single household headed by adults who both control
and guide such children as may reside with them.""58
51. The courts usually recite the general rule of construction for covenants: that unclear
restrictions are to be construed against the grantor and in favor of the free use of land. 5 R.
PowEL., THE LAW OF RAL PRopEry § 673 (1977). This property rule is equivalent to the rule
of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341 (1854), that contract liability is limited to the consequences
contemplated by the parties.
52. 21 Wash. 2d 597, 152 P.2d 1325 (1944).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 600, 152 P.2d at 326-27.
55. 71 N.J. 206, 364 A.2d 993 (1976).
56. Id. at 213 n.1, 364 A.2d at 996 n.1.
57. Id. at 214, 364 A.2d at 997.
58. Id. at 216-17, 364 A.2d at 998.
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The court found that the defendant's use of the house was of this
nature and therefore did not violate the covenant.
In Granger and Berger the prevention and administrative costs
necessary to eliminate the nuisance activity were probably higher
than the corresponding reduction in nuisance costs achieved."s The
use of the land for supporting livestock in Granger and for housing
handicapped children in Berger brought greater economic and social
benefits to the surrounding community than any benefits which
would have been achieved by enjoining those activities. Therefore,
the covenant was not enforced."
A similar result is found in Ashland-Boyd County City-County
Health Department v. Riggs.' In this case a covenant prohibiting
the use of a "business house of any kind"" was held not to bar the
use of a building subject to the restriction as an office, laboratory
and clinic by the County Board of Health. The court held that "[i]f
such use had been foreseen, the parties might have included it
within the exclusions. But a restrictive covenant cannot be extended
or enlarged by construction or implication to accomplish a purpose
that may have been included had future developments been fore-
seen. '6 3 In terms of the model, the court"s holding can be explained
by the fact that the benefits which inured to the community by the
Board of Health's activities were greater than any benefits which
could result from closing down the office.'
59. The failure of the courts to discuss adequately the relevant cost factors makes it
impossible to reach a definite conclusion in this area.
60. Accord, Easterbrook v. Hebrew Ladies' Orphan Soc'y, 85 Conn. 289, 82 A. 561 (1912).
In this case, the covenant at issue barred the use of the premises for a trade or business. The
court held that the use of a home for orphans and the aged for charitable purposes was not a
business. "The word 'business' in its ordinary and common use among men, is employed to
designate human efforts which have for their end living or reward. It is not comrionly used
as a descriptive of charitable .. .agencies." Id. at 299, 82 A. at 565. Again, the harmful
externalities which would be eliminated by enforcement of the covenant would probably
entail higher prevention costs represented by the loss of defendants activities to the wider
community.
61. 252 S.W.2d 922 (Ky. 1952).
62. Id. at 924.
63. Id. at 925.
64. Accord, Leavitt v. Davis, 153 Me. 279, 136 A.2d 535 (1957). A covenant not to erect
or maintain a building or structure of any character as to interrupt or interfere with the view
over the defendant's parcel was held not to be violated by defendant's use of the land for
parking cars, notwithstanding the fact that such use blocked plaintiff's view. The court
reasoned that "the vehicles are not buildings, nor do they have the characteristic perma-
nency [of buildings] .... Id. at 283, 136 A.2d at 537. This apparantly narrow construction
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Ellickson's model offers a perspective for understanding these
cases with greater clarity than the code words and phrases employed
by the court when breaking open a covenant. The reluctance, at
times, for the courts to enforce a covenant may be traced to the
traditional remedy granted when a covenant is found to violate an
injunction enjoining the activity. 5 The injunctive remedy often en-
tails high prevention costs which exceed the reduction in nuisance
costs it achieves. The utility of the nuisance-maker activity may be
more beneficial to the community than the benefits achieved by
forcing the nuisance-maker to cease the activity. However, by not
enjoining the activity, as in the cases discussed above, externalities
are not internalized; they remain where they lie. As with nuisance
suits, courts are applying a balancing test-the social utility of the
actor's conduct compared to the total harm caused-in determining
whether the covenant has been violated. This rationale promotes
the free use of land, but at the expense of failing to internalize
externalities generated by the landowner's activity. This may be a
better result than enjoining the activity altogether, but it is not an
efficient solution. A better approach would limit the use of the
balancing test to the determination of the proper remedy. Whether
the covenant has been violated or not would be determined prior to,
and regardless of whether injunctive relief is a proper device to
internalize the nuisance costs entailed by the violation of the cove-
nant.
This approach was followed in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement
Company." In this case, the New York Court of Appeals found that
defendant's operation of a cement plant constituted a nuisance. The
court refused to grant an injunction, the traditional remedy granted
where a nuisance is proved, rejecting a doctrine which had been
consistently affirmed. 7 The court recognized that there was no tech-
may be explained in terms of the model sketched above. The covenant had been agreed upon
sixty years prior to the lawsuit. The court most likely found that the benefits to the home-
owner of a seaview were much less than the corresponding benefits to the community of a
developed area. The harsh consequences of the injunctive remedy forced the court to deny
enforcement of the covenant. See note 65 infra and accompanying text.
65. Injunctive relief is the most common remedy granted by the courts for damage to land.
The unique characteristics of land is said to require this remedy. See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS.
LAW § 871 (McKinney 1963); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 944, comment a (1939); Lucy
Webb Hayes Nat'l Training School v. Geoghegan, 281 F. Supp. 116 (D.D.C. 1967); Decker v.
Goddard, 233 A.D. 139, 251 N.Y.S. 440 (1931).
66. 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
67. Id. at 223, 257 N.E.2d at 872, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
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nological means to abate the nuisance and that forcing the plant to
close would cause great economic damage to the surrounding com-
munity." Instead, the court awarded plaintiff permanent dam-
ages, 9 allowing the defendant to choose between continuing the
activity while paying damages to landowners burdened by the
plant, and ceasing operations. A rational decision maker will choose
the alternative which is more economically advantageous to him.
This decision, in turn, will effect the most efficient allocation of land
use resources.
70
Although Boomer was a nuisance case, its reasoning is persuasive
for a wide variety of land use conflicts.7 ' Whereas a court may find,
under the facts of Kraye, that the covenant has been violated, dam-
ages could be awarded to the defendants as a more efficient means
of internalizing the harmful externalities caused by the solar energy
system. This proposal will be fully explored below.7"
C. The Doctrine of Changed Conditions
Plaintiff, in Kraye, argued that the equitable doctrine of changed
conditions should operate to bar enforcement of the covenant. 7 Ac-
cording to the model, a covenant is designed to promote an efficient
allocation of land use resources. 7 The construction of a covenant is
therefore limited to restricting those activities which entail higher
nuisance costs than the prevention and administrative costs in-
curred by enjoining the activity. Consequently, where the condi-
tions of a neighborhood change so that the contracting parties' in-
tent may no longer be realized by enforcing the covenant, because
enforcement would entail higher costs than any corresponding bene-
fits thereby achieved, a court of equity will not enforce the agree-
ment. Professor Ellickson states: "When a common covenant
68. Id. at 223-24, 257 N.E.2d at 872, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 872. The court said that "Itihe total
damage to the plaintiff's property is . . .relatively small in comparison with the value of the
defendant's operation and with the consequences of the injunction which plaintiffs seek." Id.
at 223, 257 N.E.2d at 872, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
69. Permanent damages equals the total value of the landowner's realty. Boomer v. Atlan-
tic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
70. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
71. Professor Calabresi's preference for a damage remedy extends to all land use conflict
situations. Calabresi, supra note 6, at 1128.
72. See note 94 infra and accompanying text.
73. Brief for Plaintiff at 3, Kraye v. Old Orchard Assoc., No. C 209453 (Super. Ct. L.A.
Co. Sept. 13, 1978).
74. See notes 20-24 supra and accompanying text.
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scheme governs many parcels, high administrative costs may pre-
vent landowners from organizing to terminate the scheme even
though the prevention costs of the scheme exceed its reduction in
nuisance costs. Courts have attempted to solve this problem by
terminating those covenants where neighborhood conditions have
changed."75 The doctrine of changed conditions implicitly recog-
nizes that the parties' intent may no longer be furthered in light of
intervening factors outside the parties control. To enforce the cove-
nant would only confer a windfall on neighboring landowners.
Kraye's argument, that changed conditions render the agreement
unenforceable, requires a conceptual leap from the usual interests
of the courts in this area. Generally, the courts must decide whether
the change makes it impossible to effect the purposes of the cove-
nant. Normally, the change considered is the growth of the neigh-
borhood in a manner not anticipated by the parties. The focus is on
the continued usefulness and value of the covenant." Kraye argued
that a change in the availability of conventional energy resources
necessitated non enforcement of the covenant." This argument goes
further than the great majority of the cases and is rooted in a policy
which places the entire burden of the energy crisis on the neighbor-
ing landowners. Although there is precedent for Kraye argument,",
an efficient solution would apportion the burden of the solar energy
system among those who receive its benefits: the public, beyond the
75. Ellickson, supra note 4, at 716-17.
76. Trustees of Columbia College v. Thatcher, 87 N.Y. 311 (1182). Many cases and
textwriters have focused their attention on the proximity of the change to the restricted area.
One author has stated that "[s]ome degree of physical change in the neighborhood is essen-
tial to the existence of this defense. . . . [Cihanges outside the limits of the tract, even
though they do impinge on the border lots, do not justify any relaxation of enforcement of
the premises within the tract, so long as such enforcement remains beneficial to most of the
property in the tract." 5 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 684, at 228.10-229 (1977).
A second writer is more equivocal. "Changes ... sufficient to negative a restrictive covenant
many occur either within or without the restricted area, although courts give greater weight
to changes within the restricted area." Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 492, 495 (1973). See cases cited
therein. A third text states that the doctrine of changed conditions applies where the area
surrounding the restricted subdivision has been changed so that the building scheme for the
tract has been frustrated, whereas the doctrine of abandonment applies where the change
occurs within the subdivision. AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.39 (A. Casner, ed. 1952). Cases
may be found where changes outside the restricted tract were held to negative the purpose of
the covenant, thereby barring enforcement of the restriction. See, e.g., Jewitt v. Albin, 90 Cal.
App. 535, 266 P.2d 329 (1928); McClure v. Leaycraft, 183 N.Y. 36, 75 N.E. 961 (1905).
77. Brief for Plaintiff at 5, Kraye v. Old Orchard Ass'n, No. C 209453 (Super. Ct. L.A.
Co. Sept. 13, 1978).
78. See notes 84-93 infra and accompanying text.
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neighborhood. 9 If the solar collectors are truly ugly and reduce the
market value of defendant's land, this claim should not be rejected
by solar advocates simply because it impedes the full development
of solar energy. An efficient allocation of land-use resources requires
a thorough consideration of, and resolution to, the competing inter-
ests involved.
The cases in this area are in conflict.8 0 In Drexel State Bank v.
O'Donnell' a covenant not to erect apartment houses was at issue.
An apartment house had already been built on the block subject to
the restriction. The court upheld the restriction despite the prior
violation because it found that it still benefited the properties of the
objecting owner.8" Other cases reflect a greater concern in promoting
an efficient allocation of resources than preserving particular bene-
fits to certain neighboring landowners. For instance, one court,3 in
construing a covenant not to build within fourteen feet of the street,
refused to preserve a restriction which wasted valuable space with-
out significant benefit to anyone.8
Neither case offers a clear perspective with which to analyze the
competing interests involved in these land use conflicts. Instead of
discussing precisely what benefits and burdens would result from
enforcing the covenant, the courts unfortunately rely on traditional
property terms as if they were a talisman. In addition, the injunc-
tion, the sole remedy offered by the courts in these cases, provides
no flexibility and thereby stifles efficiency. O'Donnel, by enforcing
the agreement imposes higher prevention costs than the reduction
in nuisance costs achieved. The area was losing its residential char-
79. See note 95 infra and accompanying text.
80. It is suggested that the absence of a single illuminating perspective, which the model
offers, facilitates this inconsistency.
81. 344 Ill. 173, 176 N.E. 348 (1931).
82. Id. at 183, 176 N.E. at 352. The benefits cited by the court included light and air,
protection against the additional noise which would invariably result from the erection of
more apartment houses and the maintainance of the objecting owner's property value. Id.;
accord, Kiernan v. Snowden, 123 N.Y.S.2d 895 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
83. La Rue v. Weiser, 378 Pa. 438, 106 A.2d 447 (1954).
84. The court said: "It being a general policy of the law that land shall not be
burdened with permanent or long-continued restrictions which have ceased to be of
any advantage, equity will not, prohibit or retard improvements simply to enforce the
literal observance of a condition or covenant. Nor will equity grant injunctive relief if
the enforcement of a restriction would make the land unfit or unprofitable for use and
development, or result in far greater hardship to the servient than a benefit to the
dominant tenement." Id. at 443, 106 A.2d at 450; accord, Hirsh v. Hancock, 173 Cal.
App. 2d 745, 343 P.2d 959 (1959).
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acter. For better or worse, the land was more useful for urban hous-
ing. La Rue, by not enforcing the covenant avoided imposing high
prevention costs on the nuisance-maker but at the expense of exter-
nalities which were not internalized. A damage remedy, as dis-
cussed above, would promote efficiency by forcing the nuisance-
maker to bear the true cost of his activity; private costs will be
brought into line with social costs.
In addition to the Boomer case discussed above, two other cases,
where outdated common law principles were rejected in favor of
other alternatives, illustrate that some courts are interested in pro-
moting efficiency in land use conflicts. In Melms v. Pabst Brewing
Company85 plaintiff, owner of a reversionary interest in the estate,
brought an action against the life tenants for waste. A large brick
private residence, built in 1864 at a cost of $20,000, was on the land.
During Pabst's tenancy the general character of the real estate in
the neighborhood changed so rapidly that it became valueless for
the purpose of residential property." Factories, railway tracks and
brewing buildings had been built in the surrounding area so that the
building on the estate became isolated, standing twenty to thirty
feet above street level. The house was of no practical value and
would not generate enough rent to pay the taxes and insurance on
it. Defendant removed the house and graded the property to street
level. Plaintiff claimed that these acts constituted waste.87
At common law any change in the estate by one with less than
an estate in fee simple was actionable as waste. 8 Ameliorating waste
was actionable, even though the change enhanced the value of the
land, since it destroyed the identity of the property. In a system
without recorded deeds, title was evidenced by the physical charac-
ter of the land.89 However, since this premise no longer exists and
its only result was a tendency to promote inefficiency in the alloca-
tion of land use resources, it was rejected by the Melms court. The
court-held that "a complete change of conditions. . . resulting from
causes which none could control" could not be ignored. The tenant
need not "stand by and preserve the useless dwelling house, so that
85. 104 Wis. 7, 79 N.W. 738 (1899).
86. Id. at 13, 79 N.W. at 740.
87. Id. at 8, 79 N.W. at 738.
88. Id. at 10, 79 N.W. at 739.
89. 5 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 640, at 20 (1977).
[Vol. VII
SOLAR RIGHTS
he may at some future time turn it over to the reversioner, equally
useless. "90
The second compelling analogy is from the case United States v.
Causby. ' In this case, government airplanes, using an airport near
the appellee's farm flew directly over appellee's land and disturbed
his family so much that they were unable to live peacefully and to
support their livestock business. Causby invoked the ancient doc-
trine, "cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum" ("whose is the soil,
his is to the sky or high heavens. ")." The Supreme Court force-
fully declared that this doctrine had no place in the modern world.
"To recognize such private claims to the airspace would clog these
highways, seriously interfere with their control and development in
the public interest, and transfer into private ownership that to
which only the public has a just claim. ' '9 3 Appellee's property right
was limited to the immediate space above the land which is neces-
sary to its use and development.' In the face of a new technological
development which entailed great positive externalities for many
people the common law had to yield.
V. A Proposal
As the discussion above illustrates, some courts could find that
the covenant at issue in Kraye is unenforceable either because it was
not the intent of the parties to include solar collectors within its
prohibition or because conditions have changed which bar the con-
tinued effectiveness of the covenant. Such reasoning would foster
the growth of solar energy. Unfortunately, it also places the entire
burden of the energy crisis upon the neighboring landowners. A
more efficient solution should recognize that the exploitation of
solar energy will benefit those outside the particular neighborhood.
In short, although harmful externalities of the collector are confined
to the neighborhood, the positive externalities generated through
the use of solar energy system will inure to those outside the neigh-
90. 104 Wis. at 13, 79 N.W. at 740. The modern New York law reflects this principle. N.Y.
REAL PROP. AcTs. LAW § 803 (McKinney 1963).
91. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
92. Id. at 260-61.
93. Id. at 261.
94. This property right was effectively taken by the government's continued operations
above plaintiff's land. The government was therefore required to compensate the landowner
for the taking. Id. at 267.
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borhood. An efficient solution should seek to internalize both kinds
of externalities.
The benefit of the solar energy system to the user may be mea-
sured by the costs saved by replacing, to some extent, conventional
energy resources; the burden to the neighbors may be measured by
the drop in market value to their land. If a court determines that
the language and intent of the covenant is violated, which, in Kraye,
is probable, the more important issue of the appropriate remedy
must be addressed. Professor Calabresi argues that the damage
remedy is more efficient than the injunctive remedy. If the
nuisance-maker should find that the costs of the damage award are
less than the savings accrued by continuing the activity, he will pay
the defendants. On the other hand, if the costs saved by use of the
solar energy system do not equal or exceed the damage award, the
nuisance-maker will cease his activity. Harmful externalities of the
collectors are thereby internalized efficiently."
This solution is satisfactory if we assume that the land use con-
flict involved-the desire on the part of one landowner to exploit an
alternative energy resource versus the interests of neighboring
landowners to protect their land values-is a local problem. In fact,
the problem is nation-wide. The entire populous benefits from those
who use solar energy by lessening our dependence on expensive and
limited conventional energy resources.
Positive externalities should be subsidized by those who benefit
from them; in this case, the public. State and federal governments
are subsidizing the solar energy use with a tax credits on the sale of
solar energy systems and by not taxing the increase in property
value which results from the installation of a solar collector sys-
tem." The subsidy should be designed to equal the damage caused
95. Professor Calabresi offers two further reasons for awarding damages instead of injunc-
tive relief. First, market valuation of the property right may be unavailable or too expensive
compared to a collective valuation. Second, it allows the court to accomplish a measure of
redistribution that otherwise could only be achieved with a loss of efficiency. Calabresi, supra
note 6, at 1107. The Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles granted plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment based on section 714 of the California Civil Code. Kraye v.
Old Orchard Ass'n, No. C 209453 (Sup. Ct. L.A. Co. Sept. 13, 1978) (citing CAL. CIVIL CODE
§ 714 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). This statute bars the enforcement of any restriction which
would effectively prohibit or restrict the installation or use of a solar energy system. Whether
this statute constitutes a taking by the government was not addressed by the court.
96. Many states have enacted sales and property tax credits designed to foster solar
energy use. See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX ConE § 17052.5 (West Cum. Supp. 1979), CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 12-412(dd) (Cum. Supp. 1978), MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 211.7h (Cum. Supp. 1978-79).
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by the localized harmful externalities. In this way, the nuisance-
maker's damage payments would actually be paid by the larger
community receiving the benefits of the nuisance-maker's activity.
To the extent that these two payments are not perfectly balanced
it may be efficient for the burden to remain where it falls. This is
the conclusion of Professor Michelman's study97 on the changes of
wealth caused by government "taking" of property and its analysis
is applicable here. Michelman asserts that it is not unfair for an
individual to bear a loss where he should understand that, in the
long run, failure to compensate people in his situation will be in the
best interests of those similarly situated.8 Professor Ellickson sum-
marizes Michelman's test for noncompensation as the confluence of
three factors: 1) the efficiency of the land use which causes the loss
is transparently obvious; 2) the administrative costs of the compen-
sation are high; and 3) the losses suffered are small and widespread.
"In such a situation, the injured individual will want the public
program to continue and can see that his interests as a taxpayer
may be best served in the long run if the government does not spend
large sums in arranging to make trivial payments.""
The proposal offered above fits Michelman's paradigm case for
noncompensability. Solar energy offers an attractive solution to the
energy crisis and the difference between the damage award and the
subsidy should be small.
VI. Conclusion
If solar energy is'to be developed, as our national and local leaders
have urged, 10 outdated common law principles should not be used
to stifle its growth.' Such an approach need not sacrifice equity.02
The federal government has recently enacted a tax credit on the personal income tax returns
of those who install solar energy and other energy-saving devices. I.R.C. § 44c (Revenue Act
of 1978). For a compilation of legislation concerning solar energy see 4 National League of
Cities, Energy Report to the States 1 (1978).
97. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations
of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165 (1967).
98. Id. at 1258.
99. Ellickson, supra note 4, at 701.
100. President Carter's Energy Message to the Nation, N.Y. Times, April 21, 1977 at 1,
col. 8.
101. The writers cited in this Comment are unanimous in proposing new legal formulas
to solve land use conflicts more efficiently. Professor Horwitz has shown that the reformula-
tion of outdated legal principles to meet present needs is a common law tradition. M. HOR-
wrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw (1977).
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Surely this nation's legal system is capable of protecting both the
expectations of property owners and fostering a rational solution to
the energy dilemma. The Kraye case, and others like it in the fu-
ture, 10 3 should be approached from the microeconomic perspective
offered by those writers cited in this Comment. This approach rec-
ognizes the importance of preserving the limited natural resources
the earth possesses.
Arto Becker
102. Professor Ellickson maintains that new approaches would, in fact, be more equitable.
Ellickson, supra note 4, at 730.
103. The likelihood that the nation's energy crisis will not abate and increasing interest
in solar energy among individuals and government officials leads one to believe that more
cases like Kraye will soon come before the courts.
